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Abstract 
The financial crash of 2007-8 is the latest and greatest of the crises resulting from the process of 
`financialisation’ of the past 30 years. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 
1970s unleashed a process of liberalisation and internationalisation of finance, and a shift away 
from relationship-based to market-based finance, led by the UK and the US, acting in tandem as 
the dominant centres of global finance. Although often described as a period of deregulation, the 
disembedding of finance through liberalisation was accompanied by an enormous growth of 
formalised regulation. Although it has been generally reactive, and continually amended and 
reformed, regulation has mediated the processes through which the competitive and dynamic 
processes of change have been contested. The proliferation of regulation was national in focus, 
but it developed as an international process, through networks of regulators and specialists, who 
developed principles and standards, changing rapidly, usually under the impact of scandals and 
crises. 
Financial regulation has focused on trying to manage the diseases caused by financial 
globalisation, rather than tackling their root causes. It is therefore hardly surprising that, in a 
period of rapid liberalisation which has created ever wider and more open markets, regulatory 
failure has been endemic. The response has been to create new regulatory institutions and 
networks which have grown ever more complex, despite all efforts to improve their coordination. 
In the face of the best efforts of the regulators, the increasingly globalised financial system has 
generated new forms of risk and instability with ever-wider effects. This paper outlines the main 
features of international financial regulation, especially of banking, and the institutions involved, 
and concludes with some suggestions for a new alternative approach. 
Some of the research for this paper was conducted under a Research Fellowship from the Economic and Social 
Research Council for a research programme on Regulatory Networks and Global Governance, Award RES-000-27-
0117, and I am extremely grateful to the Council, and to Lancaster University, for the opportunity for this extended 
period of research and writing. Earlier research in the mid-1990s on financial markets was conducted with the 
support of the Leverhulme Foundation. I am especially grateful to David Campbell for many helpful suggestions and 
stimulating discussions, and to Catherine Hoskyns for comments on the draft and much else besides. Comments are 
welcome, to s.picciotto@lancs.ac.uk.  
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DISEMBEDDING AND REGULATION:  
THE PARADOX OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
Sol Picciotto 
Lancaster University Law School 
Financial crises have been a recurring feature since the emergence of the eurodollar market in the 
1970s, culminating in the great financial crash of 2007-8.1 The endemic tendency to crisis of the 
financial system belies the widely accepted orthodoxy that market-based finance and the myriad 
innovations it has spawned have generally provided an efficient and cost-effective form of 
financial intermediation. On the contrary, there is mounting evidence that excessive speculation 
causes volatility and crises, as well as imposing significant costs, which have grown 
exponentially.2 This would justify a new approach to financial regulation, which should aim to 
insulate institutions which intermediate social savings and investment from financial market 
speculation. 
Although this period is often described as one of deregulation, in fact formal regulation of 
financial markets has greatly increased.3 The disembedding of finance resulted in the emptying 
out of the moral content of financial management to allow excessive concentration on profits 
leading, in Steven Vogel’s memorable phrase, to the paradox of 'Freer Markets, More Rules' 
(Vogel 1996). Prior to liberalisation, normative standards in the closed spheres of finance were 
said to be controlled by a mere raising of the eyebrows of the Governor of the Bank of England. 
The emergence of regulatory networks in finance can be said to form part of the broader 
phenomenon of the `new regulatory state’, resulting from the functional fragmentation and 
internationalisation of statehood (Picciotto 2008). However, the type of regulation which 
emerged from international regulatory networks has generally supported market-based finance, 
                                                 
1 Surveys by IMF economists in the mid-1990s showed that since 1980 133 out of 181 IMF member states (=73.5%) 
experienced 'significant' problems in the banking sector, either 'crises' involving bank failures and government 
rescues (41 instances in 36 countries) or extensive unsoundness (108 cases); the costs ranged from 3-6% of GDP in 
richer countries to 10-15% in middle-income countries, and to 25% in developing countries (Caprio & Klingebiel 
1996; Lindgren et al. 1996, Goldstein & Turner 1996). This of course was prior to the crises which began in Asia in 
1997 and spread to Russia and elsewhere, and the great financial crash of 2007-8. A recent study by Reinhart and 
Rogoff confirms that in a longer historical timescale the period since the mid-1980s has seen a significantly higher 
incidence of banking crises (hitting alike countries at different levels of development), while 1951-1972 saw virtually 
none (Reinhart & Rogoff 2008. 8). 
2 There has been surprisingly little research on this issue, but a recent study by Kenneth French estimates 
conservatively that the costs of active investing in the US stock markets averaged over the period 1980-2006 exceeds 
the returns from passive investing by 0.67%, a capitalised cost of 10% of the market’s value (French 2008, 1558). A 
substantial part of the high costs is attributable to the growth of hedge funds, which need to generate extraordinary 
returns to justify their very high management fees; since investment is a negative-sum game, any abnormal returns 
generated by one group of investors must be at the expense of others. The highly experienced mutual fund 
investment manager John Bogle points out that the annual rate of stock turnover in the USA has shot up from around 
20% in the period 1938-76, to over 100% in 1998, and to 215% in 2007 (or 284% if the speculation in exchange-
traded funds is included; for the data see French 2008, 1552); in addition, index futures and options, which allow 
highly leveraged speculation, now total double the value of the actual stocks; unsurprisingly, market volatility has 
greatly increased (Bogle 2008, 56-9). I am greatly indebted to David Campbell for pointing me to this work and its 
significance, as well as for many insightful comments. 
3 Regulation has followed liberalisation in many types of market, although perhaps even more so in financial markets 
(Vogel 1996); Michael Moran has analysed the shift in the UK from `club rule’ to the emergence of the regulatory 
state as a saga of change `from stagnation to fiasco’, in terms of an `incomplete reconciliation with the conditions of 
modernity' (Moran 2003, 179). 
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which has led to speculation, and has provided incentives for financial innovations aimed at 
regulatory avoidance and arbitrage.  
The International Re-Regulation of Banking 
Central banks and other financial supervisors have been mainly concerned for the soundness of 
banks. The dangers of instability due to liberalisation were brought home soon after the inception 
of the internationalisation of finance, by bank failures in the early 1970s in the UK (the 
`secondary banks’), the US (Franklin National) and especially Germany (Herstatt). In response, 
in 1974 central bankers, working through the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), and on the 
initiative of the Bank of England, established what became known as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS).4 The BCBS began by attempting to allocate responsibility for the 
supervision of transnational banks, based on the broad principle of home country responsibility 
for solvency, and that of the host for liquidity. However, it was clear that this distinction could 
only be a loose one, and was hard to apply in many cases (e.g. to subsidiaries, especially joint 
ventures). Hence close cooperation, including exchange of information between supervisors, 
would be crucial; and the `virtual absence of supervision in some popular “off-shore” banking 
centres’ was noted as a problem (Blunden 1977, 327). These principles were issued as the Basel 
Concordat in 1975, which has been continually revised and expanded to try to improve 
coordination between bank supervisors, and to ensure that banks’ international operations are 
monitored in an integrated way.  
However, recurrent crises have revealed the gaps, especially those created by the `offshore’ 
system, which has been an important catalyst in the transformation of state sovereignty.5 This 
fatal flaw has continued despite the creation in 1980 of an Offshore Group of Banking 
Supervisors (OGBS), which has worked with the BCBS. First in 1982 came the developing 
country debt crisis triggered by the Mexican default, and the failure of the Ambrosiano bank due 
to reckless euromarket operations, concealed through a Luxembourg holding company which 
escaped supervision (Herring & Litan 1995, 101). This led to a revision of the Concordat in 1983, 
to strengthen the supervision of bank groups on a consolidated basis.6 Even as this was being 
negotiated, a fresh crisis was brewing which showed its inadequacies, with the final collapse in 
1991 of the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). BCCI had been `carefully 
structured … to avoid consolidated supervision in all the countries in which it did business’ by 
using subsidiaries in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands, though it was run from London and 
                                                 
4 Quinn 1989. Known at first as the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, it consists of the 
central banks and banking supervisors of the Group of Ten (G10) countries, plus Luxembourg, Spain and 
Switzerland, and reports to the G10 Governors.  
5 See  Picciotto 1999, Palan 2003. An important element in the internationalisation of finance was the creation of 
`offshore’ financial centres (OFCs), building on already established tax havens; but it should be emphasised that this 
took place with the connivance and even encouragement of some regulatory authorities in the main financial centres, 
especially London and New York, which in effect form part of the `offshore’ system. Notably, since 1984 the UK 
and the US have allowed payment of interest e.g. on Eurobonds without any withholding tax, provided that the 
paying agent certifies that the recipient is a non-resident. This in effect turns a blind eye to tax evasion, but even 
hesistant attempts by tax authorities to improve the availability of information have been blocked due to bank 
supervisors’ fears of large capital outflows (Spencer and Sharman 2006, 28-9). The US `qualified intermediary’ 
programme has been described by a specialist commentator as one which `effectively preserves bank secrecy, 
facilitating U.S. investment by nervous foreigners’ (Sheppard 2008, 3). 
6 A Note issued in March 1979 had already stated that parent supervisory authorities should evaluate solvency on the 
basis of consolidated accounts including not only foreign branches but also `by one means or another’ also 
subsidiaries. 
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Pakistan (Herring & Litan 1995, 104; Bingham 1992; Alford 1992). A new standard issued in 
1992 stressed the need to identify a clear home-country authority capable of supervising groups 
on a consolidated basis, with adequate arrangements for obtaining information from others 
involved. This was further strengthened in 1996 by a report, issued jointly with the OGBS, setting 
out 29 recommendations relating to obtaining and sharing information, and procedures for on-site 
inspection in host countries by home country supervisors.7 
This still left open the question of groups engaged in both banking and financial market 
operations. This was starkly illustrated by the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995, due to 
inadequately monitored futures market operations based in Singapore (BBS 1995, Gapper & 
Denton 1996, Singapore 1995, Zhang 1995). The Barings debacle accelerated the attempts at 
coordination between banking and financial market supervisors, with the formation in 1996 of the 
Joint Forum, linking the BCBS with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). This has focused 
mainly on trying to coordinate substantive standards on capital requirements for financial firms, 
which the BCBS had been working on for banks since the 1980s. 
The substantive standards for capital provisioning developed by the BCBS supplemented the 
procedures for coordination between supervisors. Actually, the formalisation of capital 
requirements largely resulted from the emergence of internationalised financial markets, prior to 
which central banks used more direct means of ensuring that banks under their supervision were 
sound, such as requiring them to hold deposits in the central bank, and controlling their lending. 
These did not apply to international banking activities, but when the US authorities became 
concerned at the lack of any reserve requirements for Eurodollar banking by the end of the 1970s, 
they initially found little support for international convergence of capital requirements (Kapstein 
1994, 108). In 1981 they yielded to pressure from US banks to create an International Banking 
Facility in New York, but this failed in its intention to pressurise the UK to move towards 
stronger international coordination, and instead brought a part of offshore banking onshore 
(Hawley 1984). The pressure for convergence grew again after US reserve requirements were 
reviewed following the failure of Continental Illinois Bank in 1984, and convergence was 
facilitated by the US adoption of risk-based capital requirements similar to those of the UK and 
others. This led to a bilateral agreement with the Bank of England, extended to Japan, and paving 
the way for the adoption by the BCBS of an international standard for bank capital, issued as the 
Basel Accord of 1988 (Kapstein 1994, 106-119). The Accord was eventually combined with the 
Concordat, following an extensive process of consultation with bank regulators outside the G10, 
into the Basel Core Principles issued in 1997, which link the minimum procedural requirements 
for supervision with the substantive capital adequacy standards. 
Public-Private Multi-Level Governance 
The new forms of regulation of internationalised finance have produced a multiplicity of 
regulatory bodies, interacting through a veritable maze of networks, national, international, 
infranational and supranational (Underhill 1997, Picciotto and Haines 1999). The interactions 
between these bodies makes it very difficult to attain any degree of effective cooperation or 
coherence, and create new tensions between technocracy and political accountability, which 
undermine the legitimacy of regulation (Picciotto 2008).  
                                                 
7 This has been supplemented by standards for customer identification and due diligence, as well as a report in 2003 
on `shell banks’ (defined as those managed in a jurisdiction different from that in which they are licensed, hence 
escaping supervision). These arose from heightened concerns about money-laundering, especially terrorist financing, 
after September 2001 (see further below). 
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Indeed, attempts to improve international coordination of regulation often result in the creation of 
new bodies or networks. A good example is the initiative to reform the `international financial 
architecture’ following the financial crisis which started in Asia in 1997. This resulted in the 
creation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which has attempted to improve the international 
coordination of the plethora of regulatory standards developed by international bodies related to 
finance, mainly by identifying a Compendium of financial standards and codes. In practice, the 
creation of the FSF only added another node in the complex regulatory networks.8  
A significant characteristic is the importance of regulation by private organisations, or quasi-
public bodies often given independent powers, although authorised by the state. For example, a 
major role is played by exchanges and clearing houses in formulating contracts and regulating 
trading procedures, including margin requirements and settlement arrangements. They also try to 
coordinate their regulation of markets internationally through cooperation agreements (MOUs), 
which include provisions for information exchange and cooperation, for example in monitoring 
large trades. Non-traded or `over-the-counter’ (OTC) financial instruments, including an infinite 
variety of complex transactions in derivatives and swaps, which account for the vast bulk of the 
market, are less transparent, and standards for these are also set by private associations, notably 
through the standard form contracts of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA). These are backed by its private arbitration procedures, and supported by national 
legislation and rulings to ensure their enforcement (Partnoy 2002, 217).  
A key role is played by the rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, which 
evaluate financial instruments and the creditworthiness of their issuers, both firms and 
governments (Sinclair 2005). These agencies, although private and profit-making companies, are 
in effect given an official status (so they form in effect a state-backed oligopoly), since their 
ratings have important regulatory consequences.9 However, in the words of Frank Partnoy, they 
have become `more like gate openers than gate-keepers’, especially in the development of new 
forms of structured finance.10 
The multiplicity of regulatory bodies creates significant problems of coordination. Indeed, 
supervision of global financial institutions and markets has been beset by conflicts and `turf 
battles’, both `horizontal’ (between authorities in different countries) and `vertical’ (between 
different kinds of supervisors and regulators). For example, US banking has four distinct federal 
                                                 
8 The FSF reports to the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee, and the actual monitoring of the 
extent to which jurisdictions comply with these standards and codes was taken on by the IMF and World Bank (WB). 
Since 1999 IMF and WB staff have conducted regular reviews on compliance of the main financial centres (extended 
in 2000 to all OFCs even if not IMF members) with the FSF standards, producing regular Reports on Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs). However, the ROSCs do not include a review of the centres’ cooperation in tax 
enforcement, which was referred to the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs. This has enabled OFCs to use the 
ROSCs as a seal of approval of their `high’ standards in financial supervision, while continuing to maintain strict 
fiscal and financial secrecy, thus facilitating regulatory and tax avoidance. 
9 In the US, since the mid 1970s, institutional investors have been required to place their funds in assets which are 
given a high or investment-grade by a recognised rating agency. The Basel II Capital Standards Framework (paras 
90-108) gives responsibility to national regulators for recognising whether an `external credit assessment institution’ 
(ECAI) meets the criteria which it lays down, and its capital requirements are dependent on the ratings given by 
recognised ECAIs. 
10 Partnoy 2006, 60, see also Aguesse 2007; failures by the credit rating agencies contributed significantly to the 
bubble in mortgage finance and the crisis of 2007-8 (Mason & Rosner 2008). 
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regulators, as well as regulators at the state level,11 while financial derivatives are regulated by 
both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), whose rivalries are legendary (Coffee 1995). In Europe, bank and financial 
market regulation remains at the national level,12 although within a coordinated regulatory 
framework of Directives aiming at market liberalisation. It is also loosely coordinated through 
EU `comitology’ networks, involving usually central banks, and often separate bank supervisors, 
as well as regulators for financial markets.  
Although international networks have facilitated the diffusion of regulatory forms and practices 
and their coordination, this has been in the context of competition between financial centres and 
national economies to maintain or develop their own markets. The complex interactions between 
regulators multiplied rapidly as the shift to market-based finance broke down structural barriers 
and created competition between different types of intermediary (retail and investment banks, 
insurance companies, and other financial services providers), and produced concentration into 
financial conglomerates.  
As banks became heavily involved in market-based finance, capital requirements needed to go 
beyond credit (counterparty) risks to take account of market risks. This was an important motive 
for the `risk-based’ approach to capital adequacy adopted in the Basel Accord, which assigned 
weightings to different categories of assets. However, following its introduction there was an 
explosion of innovation in the creation of ever more complex financial instruments, especially 
techniques for shifting and managing risk. The main methods have been the bundling together of 
packages of asset-backed securities (ABSs) into securitised loans (referred to as Collateralised 
Debt Obligations, or CDOs), allowing them to be moved off the balance sheet to special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) and sold off to other investors; and the use of financial derivatives, especially 
credit derivatives and swaps. The `originate and distribute’ model using SPVs was thought to 
reduce risk by spreading it, but since they directly raised their own debt, financial leverage was 
greatly increased. In effect it created what has come to be known as a `shadow banking’ system, 
creating incentives for lax lending practices since debts were passed on to others. It also placed 
great reliance on the bond gradings by credit rating agencies, which however depended on 
information supplied by the issuers, who also paid the fees for the ratings.13 
Indeed, the relative rigidity of the Basel capital standards tended to encourage such techniques 
even further, as many were motivated by avoidance or `regulatory arbitrage’ (GAO 2007, 15). A 
number of banks adopted an `originate and distribute’ lending model, in which the originators of 
loans retained only a contingent liability (dependent on the occurrence of specified `credit 
events’). The risk could further be mitigated by credit insurance or credit default swaps, greatly 
reducing or eliminating capital requirements, so enabling a ramping up of the volume of lending. 
                                                 
11 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises federally chartered banks, the Federal Reserve 
bank holding companies, the Office of Thrift Supervision other deposit-taking institutions, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has some supervisory authority for the deposit-taking institutions which it insures 
(GAO 2007, 11); state regulators supervise state-chartered banks and thrifts. 
12 The possibility of a direct role for the European Central Bank in prudential supervision has been largely rejected, 
although under article 105.6 of the EU Treaty, the EU Council acting unanimously may `confer upon the ECB 
specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial 
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings’, but it has no done so.  
13 Although the Basel II standards for approval of an ECAI include independence from political or economic 
pressures which may influence the rating, nothing is said about the standard practice that the issuer pays the fee, and 
that competition between the oligopolistic rating agencies inevitably creates pressures to give favourable ratings. 
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Amendments of the Basel standard were therefore proposed in 1994-5 to deal with off-balance 
sheet items and market risks resulting from trading activities. This began the shift towards 
allowing banks to use their own internal models to determine capital requirements, based on 
calculating `value at risk’ (VaR). 
In parallel with this, the blurring or breaking of barriers between commercial banks and other 
financial firms also created concerns about competitive equality. Even though regulators 
considered that many factors other than regulatory differences affected competition (Jackson et al 
1999), regulatory requirements create incentives for regulatory arbitrage unless they apply 
equally to economically equivalent transactions (Kuritzkes et al. 2003, 148-150). Coordination 
between regulators of banks, financial markets, and insurance was taken up through the Joint 
Forum, where the `building block’ approach of the BCBS created substantial disagreements (Steil 
1994). The `market risks’ amendments finally adopted in 1996 therefore offered two options, a 
standardised method (Basel I) and the internal models approach. The latter emerged fully-fledged 
as Basel II, entailing a shift from capital standards defined by supervisors to establishing criteria 
for the approval of risk-management systems of firms themselves. Indeed, approval of the risk 
model and capital provisioning was only one of the three pillars of Basel II, which also specified 
supervisory procedures, and market disciplines facilitated by transparency requirements. 
The consultation process for the Basel II proposals was further extended by the need to improve 
and refine the standards to cope with the explosive growth of trading of increasingly complex 
financial derivatives. Although this was mainly driven by non-banks such as hedge funds, these 
entities borrowed extensively from banks and further leveraged their capital by using it as margin 
to take positions in derivatives involving enormous exposures. The dangers involved were 
brought home with the failure in September 1998 of Long Term Credit Management (LTCM), a 
hedge fund run by Wall Street’s top financial rocket-scientists,14 which triggered a rescue 
facilitated by the New York Reserve Bank. This showed that central banks might be obliged to 
provide lender-of-last resort (LLR) support to non-banks, due to the systemic risk created by 
banks’ involvement in their activities. 
Basel II aimed to resolve the problems of rigidity of formal requirements, which are unresponsive 
to innovation or indeed tend to encourage regulatory avoidance, by harnessing regulatory 
standards to the firms’ own risk management tools. This more `reflexive’ approach has some 
advantages, for example allowing the inclusion of a wider range of risks, not only market but also 
`operational’ risks (resulting from system or managerial failures such as `rogue traders’).  
However, Basel II carries its own dangers, since in many ways it involves a reversion to self-
regulation. In encouraging firms to adopt sophisticated risk modelling, regulators have `struggled 
to balance incentives (in the form of permissible capital reductions) for banks that adopt the 
advanced risk measurement approaches with the objective of broadly maintaining the aggregate 
level of minimum required capital' (GAO 2007, 22). Indeed, the introduction of Basel II in the 
US was delayed by studies which showed that it would result in substantial reductions in 
                                                 
14 Run by Wall Street veteran John Meriwether, LTCM’s partners included Robert Merton, the Nobel-prizewinning 
economist who devised the Black-Scholes model for valuing financial derivatives. Following its collapse, a 
document leaked from the Swiss bank UBS showed that it had estimated that LTCM was leveraged at least 250 times 
- 27.2 times `on balance sheet’' but an undisclosed amount `off-balance sheet’; nevertheless, UBS had ignored its 
own lending guidelines, resulting in a loss of SwFrs 950m (Treanor & Tran 1998). The BCBS report following the 
affair that LTCM estimated the size of LTCM’s total assets at $125bn, but its notional off-balance-sheet positions at 
well over $1tr.; while its leverage ratio was 25:1 in early 1998, without taking account of derivatives; while LTCM’s 
size, leverage, and secretiveness 'may have made it a unique case', competition had led financial institutions to 
'compromise important aspects of the risk-management process', especially by offering generous terms on margins 
for OTC derivatives (BCBS 1999, 10). 
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minimum capital requirements (ibid. 26). Also, the use of risk models runs the danger of creating 
self-reinforcing practices among firms and practitioners, and their effectiveness greatly depends 
on the validity of the models used and the mathematical and statistical techniques on which they 
are based, notably the reliance on probabilities based on historical data and systems of 
backtesting.15 The establishment of detailed parameters for backtesting took international 
regulators into even more difficult and arcane regions, and indeed some specialists suggested that 
the risk modelling should be left to the banks (Rochet 2008, 31). 
The Financial Crash of 2007-8 and Regulatory Reform 
The great financial crash of 2007-8 took place just as the Basel II standard was beginning to be 
implemented. Regulators responded by affirming that this `market turmoil’ underlined the 
importance of Basel II, while accepting that it required further amendments (Wellink 2008). The 
FSF produced a report which proposed that these should include strengthening the capital 
requirements for complex structured credit instruments, default risk, and liabilities to off-balance 
sheet entities; establishing guidance for the management and supervision of liquidity; improving 
oversight procedures; and enhancing transparency and disclosure to ensure market disciplines are 
effective (FSF 2008). To try to deal with the continuing problem of consolidated supervision of 
international financial groups, a college of supervisors would be established for each major firm 
by the end of 2008. 
From the viewpoint of the regulatory authorities, it is understandable and perhaps justifiable to 
seek to learn the lessons of the crash by pressing on with Basel II, with further improvements. As 
pointed out above, Basel I created significant incentives for regulatory avoidance in ways which 
contributed substantially to the eventual crisis, especially the various devices for moving CDOs 
off-balance-sheet. Those who have recognised potential problems with risk-based capital 
requirements, especially due to the additional risk introduced by the risk models themselves, have 
suggested that they be supplemented, for example by a simple leverage ratio requirement; 
however, a leverage ratio would be pro-cyclical, and would encourage the use of off-balance-
sheet devices (Hildebrand 2008).16 
This nevertheless ducks serious questions about the existing approach to regulation posed by the 
crisis. It was significant that the UK, which had led the way in introducing the Basel internal 
models approach, nevertheless experienced its first bank run for 130 years in 2007. Indeed, the 
bank in question, Northern Rock, despite being considered a high impact firm, was given a Basel 
II waiver at the end of June 2007, allowing it greater reliance on its internal risk model, on the 
grounds that it had been extensively stress-tested. On 25 July Northern Rock declared a 30% 
increase in its interim dividend because the waiver and other asset realisations meant that it had 
an `anticipated regulatory capital surplus over the next 3 to 4 years’. Unfortunately, the scenarios 
used in the stress tests did not include what actually happened in August 2007, a collapse of the 
mortgage-backed securities market and an extended drying up of liquidity in interbank lending. 
                                                 
15 The so-called Value at Risk (VAR) models became publicised in October 1994 when J. P. Morgan made available 
over the internet its RiskMetrics system and the data needed to apply it. Although financial economists argued that 
they are consonant with portfolio theory (Dowd 1998), they were strongly criticised, notably by Naseem Taleb, for 
ignoring the effects of low-probability high-impact events, so-called `black swans’. 
16 The US authorities had in any case intended to retain a simple leverage ratio requirement as a complement to the 
Basel ratios (GAO 2007). They also propose to allow banks the option of a `standardised’ version of Basel II, which 
essentially means sticking with Basel I; it is likely that the vast majority (all but a dozen or less) would do so, both 
because of the complexity and costs of introducing internal risk models, but also because the capital requirement 
seems likely to be lower, due largely to a different method of quantifying operational risk (Rubin 2008).  
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The announcement of a rescue on 13 September started a panic which eventually resulted in the 
nationalisation of the bank (UK Treasury Committee 2008).  
What is perhaps most striking is the extent to which regulators seem to have been working in the 
dark, despite ample warning of the dangers and their potential systemic effects. The bursting of 
the housing price bubble took place over some 18 months, and it took a further 12 months or 
more for the impact of the crisis to work its way through. Yet such was degree of opacity of the 
entire `shadow banking system’ that, as it struck one eminent financial institution after another, 
the regulatory authorities seemed taken by surprise on each occasion yet again. Delinquencies 
and repossessions on US subprime mortgages had begun to rise in 2005, and by December 2006 
the Center for Responsible Lending predicted that `one out of five sub–prime mortgages 
originated during the past two years will end in foreclosure’ (Schloemer et al 2006, 3). These 
warnings were amply justified in the first half of 2007, yet in July, after Bear Stearns bailed out 
two hedge funds specialising in subprime mortgages, Fed chairman Ben Bernanke estimated in 
testimony to Congress that the cost could amount to $100b; a year later it had risen ten-fold. 
The onset of the crisis was signalled on 9 August 2007, when BNP Paribas suspended 
withdrawals from three of its hedge funds that had invested in sub–prime residential mortgage 
securities, declaring that `the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the 
US securitisation market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their 
quality or credit rating’, and that the `situation is such that it is no longer possible to value fairly 
the underlying US ABS assets in the three above-mentioned funds’. This forced the credit-rating 
agencies into a long overdue revaluation of CDOs,17 and banks began hastily to identify their 
losses and shore up their balance sheets, leading to a freezing up of interbank lending. The impact 
was immediately felt by institutions most heavily involved in market-based mortgage finance, 
such as Northern Rock, but like an undersea earthquake a tsunami was unleashed which would 
eventually overwhelm many more.  
It seems that the regulatory authorities had no clear appreciation of the potential repercussions of 
the puncturing of the bubble in house prices in the US and other countries, although they had 
plenty of time to evaluate the extent of the problem.  By August 2007 the disastrous impact on 
the valuation of mortgage-backed CDOs and the knock-on effects on liquidity and interbank 
lending were clearly known. Only in December 2007 was some coordinated action attempted, 
with a joint announcement by five leading central banks of arrangements to provide liquidity to 
the banking system and unfreeze interbank lending. Yet the crisis rumbled on for a further 9 
months to its climax. 
At the G7 meeting in Tokyo in February 2008 the estimation of write-offs related to the US 
mortgage crisis had reached $400 billion, though by April the IMF’s financial stability report 
estimated losses would come to $945b. By the time the G7 leaders had reconvened in 
Washington DC in October, the US had been forced into a recapitalisation of its entire financial 
system of some $700b, following rescues of a half-dozen of its biggest financial institutions (Bear 
Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia) involving a total of some 
                                                 
17 Mortgage-backed CDOs had generally been assigned AAA ratings by the agencies, which abruptly began to 
downgrade them by several notches from August 2007; this resulted in criticism that they had done very well from 
their role in the CDO boom, since their pricing model had changed from charging the issuer rather than the buyer, 
and that they had failed adequately to evaluate complex CDOs layered into several tranches with different risk levels, 
relying on unverified data from the issuers and historical mortgage default statistics; their response was to argue that 
their ratings were only `opinions’ on default risk (Editorial 2008). Not surprisingly, they are now the target of a 
number of investor lawsuits. 
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$245b of government guarantees, while other major entities (IndyMac Bank, Washington Mutual, 
Lehman Brothers) had been closed or allowed to fail or be bought up. In mid-September 2008 
Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bankrupt,18 while AIG was effectively nationalised; the 
rationale for the contrasting decisions was hard to understand, since both were known to have 
significant involvement in credit default swaps or insurance. If the failure of Lehman and the 
gigantic US rescue package was the climax of the crisis, its tragi-comic anti-climax came with the 
`Minsky moment’ when Bernard Madoff’s hedge fund collapsed with losses estimated at $50b, 
and was revealed to have been no more than a Ponzi scheme.19 
The impact in the UK was of a similar scale, with the government rescue package of October 
2008 being worth at least £50bn ($88bn) plus up to £200bn ($350bn) in short-term lending 
support; the £50b loan book of Bradford & Bingley was nationalised and its banking business 
sold, and a takeover was facilitated of the biggest mortgage lender HBOS by Lloyds TSB in a 
£12bn deal creating a banking giant holding close to one-third of the UK's savings and mortgage 
market. European institutions also succumbed: banking and insurance giant Fortis was partly 
nationalised by the Netherlands at a cost of 11.2bn euros; Dexia was saved by an injection of 
6.4bn euros by the Belgian, French and Luxembourg governments; while several German banks 
were rescued, and the German authorities engineered a 50bn euro deal to save Hypo Real Estate. 
The Netherlands rescued ING to the tune of $13.4bn, while Sweden's government set out its own 
bank rescue plan, with credit guarantees to banks and mortgage lenders up to a level of 1.5 
trillion kroner ($205b). The Icelandic government was forced to take control of the country's 
third-largest bank Glitnir, and then of the 2nd largest, Landsbanki, ultimately having recourse 
itself to an IMF rescue package of $2.1b. Even Switzerland threw a lifebelt of 6bn Swiss francs 
($5.3bn) to UBS, plus a funding facility for up to $60bn of distressed assets. 
The main problem seems to have been the totally opaque nature especially of OTC derivatives, so 
that the extent of exposure of financial institutions was impossible to estimate. This seems to be 
the root cause of both the collapse of trust and confidence which paralysed the markets, and the 
failure of the regulatory authorities to quantify the potential impact with any degree of accuracy. 
Indeed, despite its extensive recapitalisation from public funds, the banking system still seemed 
paralysed, requiring continuing life-support through further public credit guarantees and asset 
protection schemes. 
These events bore out the predictions of some commentators, made relatively early, that this was 
not just a limited `credit crunch’ affecting parts of the home mortgage finance system, mainly in 
the US. Notably, Martin Wolf in the Financial Times, in December 2007 described it as a 
turning-point for the world economy, and a `huge blow to the credibility of the Anglo-Saxon 
model of transactions-orientated financial capitalism’ (Wolf 2007). 
                                                 
18 The collapse of Lehman after 158 in banking  has been largely blamed on the policies of its autocratic CEO, Dick 
Fuld (Partnoy 2008); it certainly shows the weakness of corporate governance: Lehman’s Finance and Risk 
Committee included a theatre producer who had been on the board for 23 years, and a former chief of the American 
Red Cross and the Girl Scouts, but it was chaired by Henry Kaufman, the former Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
economist (Macintosh 2008), known as `Dr Doom’ for his bearish forecasts, who had resigned from his research post 
at Salomon Brothers in 1987 as it accelerated its speculation in high-risk business, and had published repeated 
warnings of the dangers of derivatives and their inadequate regulation, most recently 5 weeks before Lehman’s 
collapse (Kaufman 2008). 
19 Neo-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky’s theory of financial bubbles and crashes, based on the psychology of 
financial speculation during a boom, suggested that the final stage of speculative mania is the Ponzi scheme, i.e. the 
pyramid selling of assets in which investors are paid large returns from the continuing flow of new investments, until 
the scheme collapses (Minsky 1992).  
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Given the extent of the financial carnage, serious consideration should be given to something 
more radical than simply further reform of the Basel approach to prudential supervision. This 
form of reactive regulation is like encouraging a patient to become addicted to dangerous drugs 
while trying to manage the dosage. The encouragement of unbridled financial liberalisation has 
resulted in relentless competition and innovation, within a legal framework which allowed 
owners and managers enormous rewards, while assuming little personal risk. Since the 1970s, 
financial regulatory authorities have grown apace, and their rulebooks have multiplied. But with 
corporate governance and regulatory compliance being reduced to bureaucratic box-ticking 
(shown for example by the treatment of Northern Rock), financial regulation has stumbled from 
one crisis to the next, and the reforms on each occasion have proved inadequate to the next test.  
An Alternative Approach? 
The detailed regulatory proposals of the regulators seem far removed from the general popular 
feeling that finance must be put on a new footing, which has even been expressed by politicians. 
This was eloquently articulated in the conference hosted in Paris in January 2009, Nouveau 
Monde, Nouveau Capitalisme: éthique, développement, régulation. The conference called for a 
restoration of `trust in capitalism’ as `a humanistic economic, social and organisation, able to 
create and fairly redistribute wealth’, by drawing up a more responsible and ethical `new 
capitalism’, and even a `new world of solidarity and multilateralism’.20 Yet there still seems to be 
an enormous gap between such bold words and the actual details of the proposals for regulation 
under consideration. 
A new, and hopefully smart, approach to regulation of finance should aim to insulate the 
intermediation of social savings and investment from financial market speculation, treating banks 
and other managers of savings essentially as public utilities. This should begin with close 
attention to industry structure and competition. The rescue of failing firms has created fewer and 
larger financial conglomerates.21 Careful thought needs to be given especially to whether to re-
establish the old divisions between retail and investment banking, mortgage finance, and 
insurance. Integrated finance may have advantages in helping to spread risk, but as the crisis has 
shown only too starkly, it can also act as a transmission mechanism for risk. It should be clear 
from the crisis that the management of social savings must be segregated from financial 
speculation. 
There is also the problem that the new mega-banks may be both too important to allow to fail and 
too large to rescue. The authorities must now explicitly acknowledge the banks for which they 
accept ultimate responsibility, and finally abandon the long-discredited policy of `calculated 
ambiguity’ about their lender-of-last-resort function.22 This should entail the corollary of 
                                                 
20 From the statement on the website of the conference (http://www.colloquenouveaumonde.fr/home/), by Éric 
Besson, Secretary of State in charge of Strategic Planning, Public Policy Evaluation and Digital Economy 
Development, who opened the conference. In the way of politicians (and the academic media-stars invited to such 
events), there were were counter-balancing statements supporting `entrepreneurial risk valuation without sharing 
mistakes’, and opposing `excessive regulation’.  
21 Notably, the completion of the acquisition by Bank of America of Merrill Lynch has combined an enormous retail 
bank network with the largest brokerage and a major investment banking business, to create the biggest financial 
institution in the US. 
22 This telling phrase and the proposal are from an analysis made over ten years ago (Herring & Litan 1995, 128). 
Yet the same ambiguity’ is evident in the statement made in October 2008 by G7 finance ministers and central bank 
governors, that they `agree to take decisive action and use all available tools to support systemically important 
financial institutions and prevent their failure’. Rochet (2008) has argued that the problem is that decisions on when 
to mount a rescue are over-influenced by political considerations, so the solution should be greater independence and 
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restrictions on the activities of those banks, with a reversal of the presumption in favour of 
financial innovation (Bell & Quiggin 2006, 646). In other words, guarantees of public support for 
systemically important financial firms should be conditional on strict conditions on the type of 
financial intermediation in which they may engage. The aim should be to insulate the social 
financial intermediation system from financial speculation. 
First is the question of financial derivatives. In the early years after their invention in the 1970s 
concerns were raised that at least some of these instruments would fuel speculation and lead to 
`casino capitalism’ (Strange 1986, 113-119), and this debate has occasionally surfaced again 
especially during crises. Keynesian economists pointed out the potential for excessive speculation 
resulting from the shift from simple forwards contracts for commodities to systematic trading of 
standardised futures on organised exchanges, but derivatives in physical commodities could be 
justified by the need to manage and finance inventories in the face of uncertainties of crops due to 
the vagaries of nature (Williams 1986). The lack of any such justification for financial derivatives 
strongly suggests a need for a much more cautious approach to them, especially as speculation 
can be greatly magnified by leverage (Campbell & Picciotto 2000). Nevertheless the blanket 
justification has been accepted that they help to manage risk and reduce the cost of finance, 
despite recurrent incidents of major losses attributable to them (Kuprianov 1995). Not only that, 
but derivatives trading was allowed to expand exponentially, away from exchanges, which at 
least provide some transparency, into totally opaque OTC markets.23 Regulation has focused on 
dealing with their potential consequences. This gave free rein to the financial rocket-scientists to 
devise the ever more elaborate instruments, especially various type of credit default swaps, which 
we now know became so complex and opaque as to defeat effective valuation.  
A new approach should be based on prior approval of instruments in which different types of 
licensed financial institution would be authorised to trade. Financial derivatives should be treated 
like pharmaceutical drugs. No-one suggests that all new drugs should be released on the market, 
leaving it to consumers or even doctors to decide how safe they are and for which uses. It is now 
clear that financial derivatives can be economically toxic, and they should be regulated 
accordingly. The approvals process should include determination of the tax treatment, as well as 
conditions of use: how they should be treated on the balance-sheet and for capital provisioning; 
whether they can be traded over-the-counter or only on open exchanges; transparency (data to be 
kept on holdings, counterparties, and trading volumes); and which categories of investor should 
be allowed to deal in each. Since licensed financial entities would only be permitted to deal in 
approved instruments, there could be no danger of primary financial markets moving `offshore’. 
A similar approach should be adopted to other forms of speculation, such as hedge funds. Thus, 
financial firms backed by the public guarantee of LLR support should be prohibited from lending 
to hedge funds. By greatly contributing to the leverage of hedge funds, such loans further fuel 
financial volatility and instability, as well as creating systemic risk in the case of a hedge fund 
failure such as that of LTCM. Secondly. there should also be a crack-down on the various 
methods of tax avoidance and evasion, to which a blind eye has been turned by national finance 
                                                                                                                                                              
accountability of regulators; but this would not seem to deal adequately with the tension between moral hazard and 
the need to maintain systemic stability. 
23 The BIS has attempted to quantify OTC derivatives market activity since 1998 by surveys of market participants, 
on a 6-monthly basis; the most recent triannual report of December 2007 estimated that the total amounts outstanding 
had grown by an average annual rate of 25% since 1998, but by 33% in the period 2004-2007, reaching an estimated 
$516 trillion (BIS 2007).  
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ministries for fear of losing out in the competition among financial centres.24 Without the benefit 
of the significant reduction in the cost of capital due to the public subsidies resulting from these 
two factors, hedge fund activity would sharply diminish or perhaps even die out. An excellent 
case can be made for devising an incentive structure which would make hedge fund managers 
bear risks from their trading, rather than the present arrangements which allow them to benefit 
enormously from the upside, and lose nothing from the downside. However, to focus proposals 
for regulation on this would be to tackle the problem at the wrong end. Hedge fund investors are 
supposed to be sophisticated, or at least rich, so they may be left to bear their own losses. 
There would of course be a price to pay for the re-establishing of a truly prudential framework for 
finance. The ending of the addiction to easy credit would impose a cold-turkey cure on the 
consumption-led boom growth of late capitalism based on asset-price bubbles. Certainly, radical 
critics have warned for some time that `financialisation’ was the symptom of deep-rooted 
contradictions of an unstable growth model which rested on widening income inequalities both 
within national economies and internationally, in a vain attempt to maintain US hegemony 
(Brenner 2002, 2006, Arrighi 2007, Turner 2008). A transition to a global financial system no 
longer addicted to cutting the costs of capital to unrealistic levels by systematic avoidance of 
taxation and regulatory requirements, as well as engaging in reckless financial speculation, could 
result in a more efficient allocation of capital to productive uses. Indeed, analyses of the costs of 
financial trading support the common-sense perception that the financial sector now drains 
enormous sums from the economy which cannot be justified (Bogle 2008, French 2008). 
Coupled with a rebalanced international economy based on paying realistic social wages to 
workers in the new economic growth poles of Asia, Latin America and even Africa, as well as 
reducing income inequalities in the developed countries, a more sustainable pattern of economic 
growth could be possible. If one lesson is clear from the latest financial crisis, it is that banking 
and finance cannot be allowed to remain the province of unrestricted pursuit of private profit by 
the greedy. It must be recognised as having become highly socialised, the transmission belt 
between social savings and investment, and its institutional structures should begin to reflect this 
(Blackburn 2002). 
                                                 
24 The majority of the world’s hedge funds use Cayman Islands companies or partnerships: data collected by the 
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority for 2006 from 5,052 Cayman-domiciled hedge funds (comprising 81% of the 
6,252 active funds in Cayman) showed total net assets of US$1.38 trillion; by the end of December 2007 the total 
had grown to 9,413, mostly managed from the US and UK (CIMA 2008). However, these are generally paper entities 
used for booking the transactions, although some ancillary services such as fund administration are done in Cayman. 
The main activities of hedge fund management take place in the US and UK, but they are treated as only provision of 
advisory services. Income paid from the funds to their investors is taxable, but this is commonly evaded by routing 
such investments through companies formed in havens, taking advantage of their secrecy (Sheppard & Sullivan 
2008). Similar structures are used for other kinds of financial speculation, such as credit derivatives, which also 
entail dubious interpretations of source taxation rules on where financial transactions take place (Weiner 2008). 
However, the tax authorities in countries with major financial centres such as the US and UK have been reluctant to 
take action against such extensive blatant avoidance and evasion, presumably due to fears that financial services 
business such as fund management would to other centres.  
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